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1. Soviet military capabilities

It is estimated that the Soviet Army consists at present of approximately 2,500,000 troops, excluding those of the internal security forces, organized into about 175 line divisions and 40 artillery and A.A. divisions. No increase in the size of the Soviet standing army is anticipated, the line divisions are estimated to consist of 105 rifle, 35 mechanized, 25 tank, and 10 cavalry divisions.

Potential speeds of mobilization are estimated to be as follows:

<u>Period</u>	<u>Total Line Divisions</u>
M-Day	175
M+30	320
M+180	440
M+365	470

It is estimated that between M+5 and M+30 the existing divisions would be brought up to full strength. Between M+30 and M+180 the additional 145 divisions would become progressively fit for operations. By 1954 the greater proportion of the men mobilized will have had prior

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service in the reorganized Soviet divisions, and by Western standards, the divisions will become fit for combat at a faster rate than at present. It is estimated that within the next few years 3 million of the reserves will have been trained in the new type divisions. However, logistical difficulties, primarily transportation, would probably be the factor governing the rate at which new divisions could be employed in operation.

The four combat forces of the Soviet Air Forces have an authorized strength of 19,000-20,000 aircraft (actual strength may be as much as 10-15% below this figure). Over the next few years it is estimated that the proportion of high performance aircraft will increase considerably and advances in bomber interception and strategic bombing capabilities can be expected. It is anticipated that a good all weather interceptor will probably be introduced in 1952 and that difficulties ~~will~~ with ground control interception radars will have largely been overcome at that time. Therefore, by 1952, the USSR should have reached a status ~~X~~ of training and reequipment sufficient to provide a relatively effective fighter defense system.

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The Soviet naval expansion program indicates that the overall strength of the Soviet navy will progressively increase. In submarines, the USSR will have in 1953 an estimated 130-140 long range, 81 medium range, and 146 coastal submarines.

By the latter half of 1953, it is estimated that all the satellite ~~X~~ armies, with the exception of the Albanian, will have completed their current expansion and Sovietization progra, and, Albania excluded, will total 111 divisions (1,420,000 troops).

These increasing Soviet/Satellite capabilities will probably keep the Soviet bloc well ahead of NATO developments. Original plans called for NATO to be capable, in 1954, of withstanding the initial shock of Soviet attack and ~~this~~ thus permitting time for Western mobilization. In view of current trends, ~~thus~~ this in itself appears optimistic and certainly by 1953, NATO development of conventional forces will probably not have reduced significantly Soviet capabilities for over running Western Europe.

It should be noted, however, that this accomplishment will become

progressively more difficult as NATO forces develop, and that the

Western capability in unconventional weapons probably acts as a major

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deterrent to Soviet action.

Soviet/Satellite capabilities for local aggression obviously will have increased by 1953. However, in some cases, such as Yugoslavia, this will have been considerably offset by Western measures. Also, the danger of general war inherent in satellite military action, at least in Europe, will probably act as a deterrent to such ventures.

2. Stability of the Soviet sphere.

The stability of the Soviet regime and of Soviet control over the European satellites seems assured for the period of this estimate. While evidence of internal difficulties, particularly in the satellites, exists, this reflects a chronic problem and one which is under continuous Soviet review. Only in Albania would there appear to be even a remote possibility of a break in Soviet control before 1953.

The question of Soviet control over and/or ties with Communist China is much more complex. Knowledge is lacking on a number of vital questions and the precise status of Sino-Soviet relations cannot be determined. However, a number of postulations can be made from what evidence is available:

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a. The Chinese Communists have generally accepted Soviet leadership in international affairs although probably reserving a special niche for themselves in Far Eastern matters.

b. The USSR since the end of the war has sought to increase its control and/or influence in China by political, economic and military means somewhat similar to those used in Eastern Europe (Soviet advisors, control of Chinese Eastern Railway, occupation of Port Arthur, Sino-Soviet joint stock companies, semi-autonomous status of Manchuria, etc.). In view of Soviet experience in the use of such techniques, it is reasonable to assume that the USSR has made progress along these lines.

c. There can be little doubt but that the Kremlin has carefully studied the Tito episode and attempted to draw the appropriate lessons. The USSR, therefore, is presumably being careful in China ~~to~~ to avoid such mistakes as made Tito's defiance possible.

d. Although the Korean war is the type of development which could conceivably bring any latent Sino-Soviet differences to the fore, there has been no firm evidence of Sino-Soviet friction relating

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to the Korean war or the current armistice talk.

Although a basis for ~~disagreement~~ argument may exist over the question of Soviet control versus influence, and the ultimate outcome of the Soviet effort to control China, available intelligence does not suggest an imminent split and it is furthermore apparently in the interests of both parties to preserve their close alignment, whatever its exact character. ~~XKEYX~~ Thus, any estimate through mid-1953 should be based on an assumption of continued close cooperation between the USSR and China.

3. Probable Soviet policies through mid-1953.

We have estimated that the prevention, limitation or at least delay of the free world's defense effort, including the rearmament of *Western Germany* & *Japan* is a primary objective of Soviet policy at present. Since the critical period in this defense effort extends through at least 1954, these objectives will presumably continue to be of primary importance to the Kremlin through the period of this estimate (mid-1953). Faced with this situation, the Kremlin has, in general terms, four *basic* courses open to it: (1) to precipitate war itself, (2) to continue its expansionist policy, knowingly accepting

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the risk of general war involved in local actions similar to the Korean war, (3) to maintain its present general position, but refraining from dangerously provocative and risky ventures (i.e., to close out the Korean war and refrain from other overt military ventures), and (4) to promote a broad relaxation of tension, involving actual Soviet concessions, designed to undermine the free world's defense effort.

With regard to the first alternative, we have estimated that the Kremlin, at least for the next year desires to avoid general war, and it seems probable that the Kremlin would continue through mid-1953 to avoid precipitating a general war unless that appeared to be the only solution open to it. With regard to the second alternative, the same argumentation applies, except that the Kremlin may be convinced of the inevitability of early hostilities and feel obliged to make as much progress before that eventuality as possible. The third alternative offers the possibility of slowing the Western defense effort (which may be all the Kremlin considers necessary to render the West impotent in the face of renewed expansion at some future date) and at the same time would not ban the Kremlin from moderate ~~adversary~~ ^{adversary} ~~actions~~ ^{actions} through the ~~secret~~ ^{secret} exploitation of various situations

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Chinese Communists (e.g. intervention in Indo-China on a limited scale).

With regard to the fourth alternative, any Soviet move in this direction would presumably be based on an estimate that the Western defensive effort was assured of success and that, other than war, retreat by the Soviet Union was the only means by which the Kremlin could prevent the balance of power from being tipped irrevocably against the USSR.

In order to determine probable Soviet policies for the next two years, it is necessary to examine the world situation as it may appear to the Kremlin, keeping in mind the general considerations outlined above regarding broad alternative policies.

Europe

In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty has drawn a fairly firm line which the USSR or the Satellites cannot cross without grave danger of general war. The Western commitment to Yugoslavia has increased, and the Kremlin must now estimate that a Soviet or satellite attack on Yugoslavia also entails a grave risk of general war. Also, the Western defensive effort, despite its difficulties and delays ~~is~~ is underway and,

while it might not balance Soviet/Satellite capabilities for some time to

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come, it might restore confidence in Western Europe and reduce the effectiveness of the threat of Soviet force as a weapon of Soviet policy.

German rearmament may soon be a fact and increases in the US forces in Europe may lend impetus to the defense effort as evidence of US support.

In spite of these factors, the Kremlin probably does not feel completely blocked from further gains in Europe. Its own strength is growing and the rapid development of the satellite armies will, to a considerable extent, offset Western developments over the next two years.

Communism remains a strong political force in Western Europe, particularly France and Italy, and the desire for peace or "neutralism" offers opportunity for exploitation to Soviet advantage. Of perhaps greater importance, the Western defense effort is subject to numerous political and economic problems and is by no means assured of ultimate success. While the situation in Europe might preclude any immediate Soviet/Communist successes, the long range prospects probably appear sufficiently good to the Kremlin that it does not consider a drastic revision of Soviet policy as either necessary or desirable.

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The Near and Middle East

The current situation in the Near and Middle East is undoubtedly a source of satisfaction to the Kremlin. The situation in Iran remains in flux and may yet provide a suitable opportunity for a Tudeh seizure of power or may develop in such a way as to make Soviet intervention feasible without undue risk of general war. Partly as a result of the Iranian

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situation, [REDACTED]

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differences with Egypt, Abdullah's assassination, Arab-Israel friction, nationalist rumblings in Iraq, and tension between India and Pakistan all point toward continued instability which at slight expense and little risk could be exploited to Soviet advantage. For the present these various situations are, in the eyes of the Kremlin, probably developing satisfactorily without any extraordinary effort on the part of the Kremlin. For the present, the USSR can well afford merely to observe developments keeping alert for any unusual opportunities.

The Far East

In the Far East, the Kremlin may be under pressure to alter the trend of developments since the outbreak of the Korean war. Communist

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plans in Korea were thwarted by UN intervention on behalf of the Republic of Korea, and the USSR may have prompted the current cease fire talks in an effort to liquidate a situation which could easily lead to an increasing Soviet commitment and ultimately to open hostilities between the USSR and US. Partially as a result of the impetus provided by the Korean war, a US sponsored Japanese Treaty is about to be signed, and, unless Soviet efforts to disrupt the San Francisco conference are successful, the Soviet and Chinese Communist position on a Japanese Treaty will be thwarted, the US will continue to enjoy base rights in Japan, and Japanese rearmament will become a reality.

Despite these reverses, the Kremlin can look with considerable satisfaction on the Far Eastern situation. Exploitable differences exist among the Western powers and among the non-Communist Asiasitic countries which would probably re-emerge in the event of a cessation of hostilities in Korea. Indo-China and Burma are in exposed positions with strong internal Communist pressures and, perhaps even without more than covert support from the Chinese Communists, these countries might be taken over.

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thus increasing the vulnerability of the other Asiatic countries to Communist expansion. China, despite the effect of the Korean war, remains a formidable military power by Asiatic standards and, allied with the USSR, constitutes an effective threat to free governments in SouthEast Asia. Furthermore, Communist military power could presumably be used in Asia with less risk of general war than in Europe.

From the attempt to look at the world from the vantage point of the Kremlin, it does not appear that the Politburo is under any great compulsion to effect any basic changes in their policy or tactics. It seems likely that the UN reaction in Korea and the risks involved in similar ventures elsewhere will deter the Kremlin from further overt military actions *at least in Europe* during the period of this estimate. During this period the Kremlin will attempt to capitalize propagandistically on the Communist peace campaign in the hope of slowing or limiting the free world's defensive effort, but it seems unlikely that this effort will be pressed to the point of actual Soviet concessions. The Kremlin would probably seriously consider actual concessions only if it were convinced of the future success of

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the Western defensive effort and of the continued solidarity of the ~~non-Communist~~

non-Communist world. Even under those circumstances there is a strong

possibility that the USSR, rather than try and thwart Western developments

after precipitating global war or, perhaps more likely,
by means of concessions, would attempt to consolidate and defend its

holdings with a view to waiting, for an indefinite period, for the

development of new opportunities. Actually, the Kremlin probably views

current Western efforts as doubtful of ultimate success and, at the

same time, probably considers that current trends in various sections

of the globe offer adequate opportunities for further Communist successes

with little risk.

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